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Article
Tying Off All Loose Ends: Protecting
American Citizens from Torture Beyond
America's Borders
Landon Wade Magnussont
In the United States, the law prohibits the government from torturing its citizens.
U.S. law also prohibits the government from sending its citizens to another
country where they would likely be tortured. These two scenarios seemingly
covered all possible ways that the U.S. government could bring about the torture of
its own citizens - until Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008). In Munaf, the
Supreme Court posed an intriguing question: Does the law also forbid the U.S.
government from transferring custody of an American citizen to a country that
will likely torture him, when the U.S. government was maintaining custody of that
citizen within, and at the permission of, the country that engages in torture? This
Article seeks to definitively close this possible loophole through two points of attack.
First, it looks to emerging theories on the extra territorial application of the
Constitution and concludes that Fifth Amendment Substantive Due Process
extends beyond America's borders to protect her citizens from any government
action that would lead to their torture. Second, this Article explores the federal law
that ostensibly leaves open the possibility for torture and, after analyzing its
drafters' intent as well as the international conflicts that a pro-torture
interpretation would cause, concludes that any loophole found is false.
t LL.M., Ecole de droit de la Sorbonne-Universit6 Panthon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). J.D., J. Reuben
Clark Law School-Brigham Young University. B.A., Brigham Young University. I would like to
thank Professor David H. Moore at the J. Reuben Clark Law School for his aid and
encouragement while writing this paper. Email: lwm6@byulaw.net.
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INTRODUCTION
On the same day that the momentous Boumediene v. Bush' opinion was
issued by the United States Supreme Court, Munaf v. Geren,2 another
important decision concerning the extraterritorial applicability of
constitutional protections and the Habeas Corpus Statute,3 was issued with
much less fanfare.4 Perhaps because the decision was unanimous,5 or
perhaps simply because it was overshadowed by the Boumediene decision,
Munaf as well as the controversial issues that it tackled and, more
importantly, those that it left unanswered, have seemingly flown under the
radar.
In Munaf, a multi-national force in Iraq led by American military
personnel, arrested and detained two American citizens for allegedly
breaking Iraqi law. 6 Next-friend habeas corpus petitions were filed on
behalf of each of these detainees in the Federal District Court for the District
of Columbia, requesting that the court enjoin the American Armed Forces
from releasing the detainees into Iraqi custody.7 To ascertain whether that
injunction should be granted, the Court had to determine first, whether the
federal district court had jurisdiction over habeas petitions in this situation
(i.e., for American citizens, held by American troops within another State's
sovereign territory), and then whether a court could exercise that
jurisdiction to enjoin the petitioners' transfer out of American custody.8
While the Court ruled in favor of the petitioners by holding that
"United States courts have jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed on
behalf of American citizens challenging their detention" by American forces
outside of the territory of the United States,9 the ruling ultimately went
against them as the Court held that "district courts [cannot] exercise
[habeas] jurisdiction to enjoin [American forces] from transferring"
American citizens outside of American territories and possessions into the
custody of local authorities or to be tried by those authorities.10
This summation, however, omits one very important detail which in
1. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
2. 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
3. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 685 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1)(2008)).
4. Both the Munaf and Boumediene decisions were issued on June 12, 2008.
5. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a majority opinion for the unanimous court, with Justice
Souter writing a concurrence which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined.
6. These two naturalized citizens of the United States were accused of acts such as aiding
and abetting former Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and kidnapping
Romanian journalists. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 681-85.
7. Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Mohammed v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d
115, 118 (D.D.C. 2006).
8. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 680 ("First, do United States courts have jurisdiction over habeas
corpus petitions filed on behalf of American citizens challenging their detention in Iraq by the
MNF-I? Second, if such jurisdiction exists, may district courts exercise that jurisdiction to enjoin
the MNF-1 from transferring such individuals to Iraqi custody or allowing them to be tried
before Iraqi courts?").
9. Id. at 680, 688.
10. Id. at 680, 705.
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turn elicits a significant question left unanswered by the Court. One of the
detainees originally sought his injunction out of fear that his Iraqi
custodians would torture him." The Supreme Court dismissed his claim
because passing judgment on the humaneness of the treatment of American
citizens is the prerogative of the political branches.12 Then, because it was
unnecessary to the holding, the Court refused to consider whether the
United States' political branches could knowingly transfer a U.S. citizen
from its custody into the hands of a sovereign that would likely torture
him, when that citizen is already located within the territory of that
torturing sovereign.'3 Could such rare circumstances allow the U.S. to
knowingly surrender one of its own citizens into the hands of a likely
torturer?
We already know that the U.S. government cannot torture its own
citizens, and that it cannot force its citizens across borders where they will
likely be tortured. However, Munaf apparently created a new avenue for
American complicity in the torture of its citizens-which may be
particularly troublesome in light of the modern American lifestyle.
Currently, Americans make about 60 million trips outside the United States
each year,14 approximately 3.2 million Americans reside outside of U.S.
borders, 5 and more than one half million federal employees and their
dependents, including military personnel, live overseas.' 6 The sheer
number of Americans living abroad would suggest that the number of
Americans arrested and detained each year while overseas is not
insignificant.1 7 There is not significant data about how many of those
Americans are actually detained by American authorities while abroad.
Nevertheless, it appears that the arrest of an expatriate U.S. citizen, and that
citizen's possible detention by American authorities, may be much less
11. Id. at 700.
12. Id. at 700-703.
13. Id. See also id. at 706 (Souter, J., concurring) ("The Court accordingly reserves judgment
on an 'extreme case in which the Executive has determined that a detainee [in United States
custody] is likely to be tortured but decides to transfer him anyway."').
14. Bureau of Resources Management, U.S. Department of State, FY 2003 Performance and
Accountability Report 141 (2003), http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/perfrpt/2003/html/
29037.htm.
15. Id.
16. U.S. Census Bureau, Issues of Counting Americans Overseas in Future Censuses (Sept. 28,
2001), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/overseas/overseas-congress-
report.html. While the number of military personnel who are permanently stationed overseas
is expected to decrease over the next five years due to the Department of Defense's global
realignment strategies, the current global presence of American military forces is nevertheless
remarkable. See Rick Pearson & Stephen J. Hedges, U.S. to Redeploy Troops, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17,
2004, at C1.
17. Kevin Herbert, The Terrorist Threat to the American Presence Abroad: A Report of a
Consultation of The Critical Incident Analysis Group and The Institute for Global Policy Research, Part
II. 2. Threat to Citizens Overseas, University of Virginia, Apr. 12-13, 1999,
http://www.healthsystem.virginia.edu/internet/ciag/publications/reportterrorist threat-a
broadscl999.pdf (report by the Office of Overseas Citizens Services, U.S. Dept. of State)
(reporting that approximately 6,000 Americans are arrested and detained while outside of
United States jurisdictions every year). See Christopher Reynolds, Arrested Abroad: A Rare
Glimpse of Trips Gone Wrong, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007.
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exceptional than in years past.
Moreover, while Americans are abroad, many of the laws and
guarantees that protect them while at home do not apply. Indeed, even
many constitutional protections that are considered fundamental
supposedly do not restrict the U.S. government's actions with regard to its
citizens while they are beyond American borders.18 In addition, Americans
who break foreign laws are generally subject to all the methods of trial and
punishment of the country in which they committed those crimes, even
when American laws would proscribe those methods.19
As a result, leaving Munaf s question unanswered allows too much
room for abuse. This Article therefore works to answer that question by
arguing that American federal and constitutional law prohibit the intra-
State transfer of U.S.-held detainees when it is more likely than not that the
State receiving those detainees will torture them. 20 Thus, once an American
citizen has entered into the custody of the United States government,
whether within the U.S. or abroad, there is no longer any excuse for that
person to be tortured.
In Part I, this Article shows how the Constitution extends beyond
American borders to protect individuals from torture through the Fifth
Amendment Substantive Due Process Clause. Part I begins with a brief
overview of the jurisprudence surrounding the extraterritorial application
of the Constitution, especially as it has been established by the Insular
Cases. Then, it proceeds to examine the newest developments in the
extraterritorial application of the Constitution, specifically analyzing the
Boumediene case and its functional approach. Part I concludes by applying
that functional approach to the question posed by this Article, ultimately
finding that it allows the Constitution to reach beyond American borders to
prohibit the U.S. government from transferring American detainees into the
custody of likely torturers.
Part II examines the extent to which U.S. federal law also bars the
transfer of expatriate American detainees. This Part first analyzes the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARR Act), showing that
even though the Act's language does not clearly prohibit such transfers, its
intent does. Then, this Part shows that even if the Act's legislative history is
18. Surprisingly, American intelligence agencies currently proclaim that they can explicitly
target and assassinate Americans overseas without resorting to constitutional procedural
requirements before depriving an individual of her life. Ellen Nakashima, Intelligence Chief
Acknowledges U.S. May Target Americans Involved in Terrorism, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2010.
Professors Murphy and Radsan present an interesting discussion of why any individual, either
American or not, targeted for killing by the CIA is entitled to constitutional Due Process.
Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 405 (2009).
19. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109,123 (1901).
20. This Article will consistently refer to the "more likely than not" standard in situations
of transferring people to torture, since that was included as one of the U.S. Senate's
reservations to the Convention Against Torture upon ratification. Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=
2&mtdsg _no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
22 [Vol. 15
4
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol15/iss1/2
Tying OffAll Loose Ends
unclear as to its intent, the Charming Betsy doctrine nevertheless requires an
interpretation that is not incongruous with international law -prohibiting
the U.S. from transferring anyone to likely torture.
Finally, Part III addresses an important objection to this Article's
argument that was raised by Chief Justice Roberts in the Munaf opinion.
The question is: if the United States refuses to transfer an alleged criminal
into the custody of a torturing State, does that not essentially grant the
criminal a "get-out-of-jail-free" card?21 Generally, notions of justice and
fundamental fairness would oppose any transfer that would create such an
outcome. Consequently, Part III demonstrates how the United States is also
permitted to assert jurisdiction over detainees and prosecute them in the
United States when it cannot transfer them for fear of imminent torture.
The United States cannot torture its citizens at home. Neither can it
send its citizens abroad to be tortured. In the end, this Article hopes to
conclusively "tie-off all of the loose ends" that would allow the American
government to be responsible for the torture of one of its citizens by also
showing that the U.S. government is forbidden from transferring an
American into the custody of a State where he would, more likely than not,
be subjected to torture, even when the American is already within that
State's territory.
I. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND DUE PROCESS EXTEND To
DETAINEES ABROAD
The degree to which the Constitution protects individuals when they
are not on United States territory is a question that has produced a
tremendous amount of jurisprudence and scholarship.22 However, this
Article will only give a brief summary of the doctrine before approaching
the newest cases on the subject and the manner in which they extend many
of the Constitution's protections, most importantly Substantive Due
Process, to U.S. citizens worldwide while they are under American
authority.
A. The Insular Cases and the Extraterritorial Application of the
Constitution
Prior to the end of the nineteenth century, the question of how far the
protections of the U.S. Constitution extended beyond the United States had
not been frequently addressed. All that was clear, as evidenced by cases
21. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 697 (2008) ("In the present cases, the habeas petitioners
concede that Iraq has the sovereign authority to prosecute them for alleged violations of its
law, yet nonetheless request an injunction prohibiting the United States from transferring them
to Iraqi custody. But . . . habeas is not a means of compelling the United States to harbor
fugitives from the criminal justice system of a sovereign with undoubted authority to
prosecute them.").
22. See, e.g., Charles E. Littlefield, The Insular Cases, 15 HARV. L. REV. 169 (1901).
2012] 23
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such as Dred Scott v. Sandford,23 as well as federal statute, 24 was that the
protections of the Constitution extended to all American territorial
possessions. 25 However, even this principle would fall apart as the U.S.
entered the Age of Imperialism.
Caught up in the imperialistic frenzy of the late 1800s, the U.S.
government worked to expand its global influence and possessions. The
most significant of those expansions occurred as a result of the Spanish-
American War, after which the U.S. acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Philippines.26 However, contrary to prior practice, where new territories
were acquired with the ultimate objective of admitting them to the Union as
new states, the consensus among contemporary Americans was that the
new territories should never acquire statehood. 27 This understanding is
reflected in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence after it took on a series of
cases concerning the application of the Constitution in those territories -
they are collectively known as the Insular Cases.28
Downes v. Bidwell, one of the most important of the Insular Cases,29 is a
good illustration of the group. In Downes, a New York customs collector
23. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450-51 (1856) ("The powers over person and
property of which we speak are not only not granted to Congress, but are in express terms
denied, and they are forbidden to exercise them. And this prohibition is not confined to the
States, but the words are general, and extend to the whole territory over which the
Constitution gives it power to legislate, including those portions of it remaining under
Territorial Government, as well as that covered by States.... [Clitizens of a Territory, so far as
these [rights over person and property] are concerned, [are] on the same footing with citizens
of the States . . . .").
24. 1 Rev. Stat. i § 1891 (1878) ("The Constitution and all laws of the United States which
are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organized
Territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized as elsewhere within the United States.").
25. Professor Burnett presents a compelling argument that the law concerning the
application of the Constitution to the territories pre-Insular Cases was much less clear than I
make it out to be, and points to the fact that if the Dred Scott decision did indeed extend the
Constitution to all territories ex proprio vigore, then any antecedent congressional enactments
would be either plainly redundant, or evidence that Congress believed that the Constitution
only applied to the states in cases where it extended that application. Christina Duffy Burnett,
A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality after Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 985-986
(2009). However, since that is beyond the scope of this Article, I simply assume the position of
many of the critics of the Insular Cases, that the Insular Cases broke with precedent in forming a
new view.
26. See Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, arts. I-III, Dec. 10, 1898,30 Stat. 1754, 1755-56.
27. Burnett, supra note 25, at 987 n.40 (citing contemporary sources to show that both
"imperialists and anti-imperialists ... were on the whole opposed to statehood: The former
argued in favor of keeping the new territories as colonies; the latter argued in favor of
relinquishing them altogether").
28. Juan R. Torruella, One Hundred Years of Solitude: Puerto Rico's American Century, in
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION
241, 248 n.14 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) (Judge Torruella considers
the Insular Cases to include: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S.
221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243
(1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S.
392 (1901)). The Boumediene Court adds Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) and Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) to this list. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
29. Burnett, supra note 25, at 988.
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had imposed duties on a shipment of oranges coming from Puerto Rico.30
The problem with this, of course, is that if Puerto Rico were an integral part
of the United States, the imposition of duties would be contrary to the
Uniformity Clause of the Constitution, which requires that "all duties,
imposts and excises . . . be uniform throughout the United States."31
Therefore, the question before the Court was whether Puerto Rico was
indeed part of the United States. 32 Surprisingly, the Supreme Court held
that it was not.33 Because none of the new territories had been incorporated
through their acquisitional treaty or through an act of Congress, none of
them had become part of the United States.34 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court held that the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution did not apply to
unincorporated territories.3 5 The Supreme Court then followed the Downes
reasoning to limit the extension of many basic constitutional guarantees to
individuals "outside" of the United States, even though they were located
within unincorporated American territories.36
Yet, while denying residents of these territories the benefit of the
Constitution, the Insular Cases provided an additional theme-that even
though the Constitution does not completely apply outside of the United
States, many fundamental constitutional rights apply of their own force
where the U.S. government exercises power.37 The Supreme Court in
Downes made it quite clear that even though the Constitution did not apply
to the territory in question, that did not in any way subject the residents of
that territory "to an unrestrained power on the part of Congress to deal
30. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 247 (1901).
31. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
32. Downes, 182 U.S. at 249.
33. Id. at 287.
34. Id. at 279-81.
35. Id. at 287.
36. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922) ("In Porto Rico, . . . the Porto
Rican can not insist upon the right of trial by jury, except as his own representatives in his
legislature shall confer it on him. The citizen of the United [S]tates living in Porto Rico cannot
there enjoy a right of trial by jury under the federal Constitution, any more than the Porto
Rican. It is locality that is determinative of the application of the Constitution, in such matters
as judicial procedure, and not the status of the people who live in it."); Ocampo v, United
States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) ("[In . . . respect [to the Fifth Amendment grand jury
requirement,] the Constitution does not, of its own force, apply to the [Philippine] Islands.");
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 332 (1911) (" [ln the absence of congressional
legislation to that end, there [is] no right to demand trial by jury in criminal cases in the
Philippine Islands."); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) ("The power to govern
territory . . . does not require [Congress] to enact for ceded territory, not made part of the
United States ... the right of trial by jury.").
37. U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1990). Downes, 182 U.S. at 283 ("Even
if regarded as aliens, they are entitled under the principles of the Constitution to be protected
in life, liberty, and property."). Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148 (finding that if trials by jury were a
fundamental right, that would have probably affected the Court's holding). Jon M. Van Dyke,
The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U.
HAW. L. REV. 445, 459 (1992) ("The full effect of the Insular Cases was thus to declare that (1)
Congress has general and plenary power over the territories (which it can delegate to
executive agencies), but that (2) these powers are limited by certain fundamental rights of the
territorial inhabitants.").
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with them upon the theory that they have no rights which it is bound to
respect."38 As a result, even though the Insular Cases purport to disavow the
extraterritorial expansion of complete constitutional protections, their
extension of fundamental rights to individuals under American authority
while in territory that would never become a part of the United States
"cracked open" the door to further applications of the Constitution beyond
U.S. borders.
B. The War on Terror and the Expanding Constitution
The doctrines elucidated in the Insular Cases would be revisited and
questioned many years later when the U.S. engaged in its War on Terror. 39
While waging campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. captured
many combatants and detained them at sites in Afghanistan,40 Iraq 41
Cuba,42 and the United States itself.43 However, because the War on Terror
is unlike any other war in which the U.S. has participated,44 Significant
questions concerning the treatment of detainees, the determination of their
combatant status, and whether they have the right to challenge their
detention became very important and were answered by landmark
decisions such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld45 and Boumediene v. Bush.46 Finding the
door cracked open by the Insular Cases, these decisions would throw it ajar
and allow for the possible extension of many constitutional protections,
such as Substantive Due Process, to American citizens far beyond the
borders of any incorporated United States territory.
1. Hamdi Mandates Due Process for American Detainees
Mr. Yaser Esam Hamdi, a Louisiana-born American citizen, was
captured on an Afghan battlefield shortly after September 11, 2001.47 After
being detained and interrogated in Afghanistan, Hamdi was transferred to
the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay where he stayed for about
38. Downes, 182 U.S. at 283.
39. While each of the Insular Cases occurred early in the twentieth century, see supra note
28, the doctrine that they established would be reconsidered on a few occasions. In one of
them, Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979), the Court held that constitutional protections
against illegal searches and seizures applied to Puerto Rico. Id. at 474. In a brief concurrence,
Justice Brennan would argue that any implicit limits to constitutional rights based in the
Insular Cases were anachronistic. Id. at 475-76 (Brennan, J., concurring). In another case, Harris
v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980), the Supreme Court held that Congress did not violate the Fifth
Amendment's equal protection guarantee by providing Puerto Rico with a lower level of
Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children than it did the States, since Congress may
discriminate against citizens of its territories along the rational basis standard. Id. at 651-652.
40. U.S. to Cede Control of Bagram Prison, WASH. PosT, Jan. 10, 2010, at A10.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
44. Id. at 520.
45. Id. at 507.
46. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
47. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510, 513.
26 [Vol. 15
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four months.48 Upon discovering that Hamdi is an American citizen, U.S.
authorities transferred him to naval brigs on American soil in Virginia and
South Carolina.49 At the outset, the U.S. Government claimed the right to
designate Hamdi as an enemy combatanto and therefore detain him
indefinitely without any formal charges or proceedings.51 It based its claim
on the President's inherent constitutional power to protect national
security52 as well as on congressional authorization.53
A Supreme Court plurality54 disagreed with this assessment. After
balancing the government's interest in avoiding judicial process55 with
Hamdi's in maintaining it,56 Justice O'Connor's controlling plurality
concluded that a citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status is
entitled to due process.57 In fact, according to the plurality, "a citizen-
detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must
receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker." 8 While the Hamdi Court did not provide a detailed list of
48. Id. at 510.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 510.
51. Id. at 510-11.
52. Id. at 516-17.
53. The congressional mandate here is the Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF) which granted the President the authority to "use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks." Id. (citing the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
54. The Hamdi Court divided into four groups. Justice Clarence Thomas was his own
group, representing the most conservative opinion toward executive deference in war-making
decisions. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579 (Thomas, J. dissenting) ("The Executive Branch, acting
pursuant to the powers vested in the President by the Constitution and with explicit
congressional approval, has determined that Yaser Hamdi is an enemy combatant and should
be detained.... As such, petitioners' habeas challenge should fail, and there is no reason to
remand the case."). Justices Scalia and Stevens were Justice Thomas' polar opposite, calling for
the greatest restrictions on the Executive's power to detain. Id. at 579 (Scalia, J. dissenting)
("Whatever the general merits of the view that war silences law or modulates its voice, that
view has no place in the interpretation and application of a Constitution designed precisely to
confront war and, in a manner that accords with democratic principles, to accommodate it.").
Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred in the Court's decision, although they did not feel that
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force authorized the detentions. Id. at 541 (Souter, J.
concurring in part, dissenting in part, concurring in the judgment) ("The Government has
failed to demonstrate that the Force Resolution authorizes the detention complained of here
even on the facts that Government claims."). Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices
Kennedy, Breyer, and O'Connor, who authored the opinion, formed the plurality. Id. at 508
(plurality opinion).
55. According to Justice O'Connor, the government's interests here include (1) "ensuring
that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against
the United States" and (2) preventing the military from being excessively burdened by judicial
process while it is waging a war. Id. at 531-32.
56. Justice O'Connor listed Hamdi's interests to include: (1) avoiding an erroneous
deprivation of liberty, and more broadly, (2) avoiding the possibility of executive abuse by
allowing the President to detain individuals without any process whatsoever. Id. at 529-31.
57. Id. at 509.
58. Id. at 533.
9
Magnusson: Tying Off All Loose Ends: Protecting American Citizens from Torture Beyond America's Borders
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
what must be done to satisfy the notice and hearing requirements of due
process, it went so far as to recognize that "a United States citizen captured
in a foreign combat zone"59 -at least while that citizen is being held on U.S.
territory -is entitled to Due Process. 60 While this is not a tremendous shift
away from the Insular Cases, Hamdi becomes a stepping stone for a shift
toward the possibility of extending constitutional rights to Americans
anywhere in the world.
2. Boumediene Expands the Extraterritorial Application of
Constitutional Rights
Picking up where Hamdi left off, Boumediene v. Bush6l confirmed that
constitutional rights can extend beyond American territorial borders.62
Boumediene began as a Guantanamo detainee case like many others. Mr.
Lakhdar Boumediene, an Algerian-born citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
was captured in Bosnia on suspicion of plotting to blow up an American
embassy and then transferred to Guantanamo. 63 By the time his habeas
petition reached the Supreme Court, he had already been detained by the
U.S. government for at least six years.64
What distinguishes the Boumediene decision from other cases are not the
circumstances of Mr. Boumediene's capture or detainment, but the
rationale that the Supreme Court used in granting him the constitutional
right to challenge his detention, in spite of its extraterritorial nature. As
stated by Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion, there is no bright-
line rule for determining the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution;
instead, "questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and
practical concerns." 65  Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy,
constitutionally guaranteed rights may indeed reach across international
borders and determining whether they do "depends upon the 'particular
circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives which
Congress had before it' and, in particular, whether judicial enforcement of
59. Id. at 523.
60. Contra Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950) (denying the privilege of
litigation to the individuals in this case in part because "the scenes of their offense [and] their
capture ... were ... beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States").
61. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
62. Justice Scalia noted this possibility in his dissent, protesting that Boumediene's
functional test was "so inherently subjective that it clears a wide path for the Court to traverse
in the years to come." Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 843 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Steven Erlanger, Ex-Detainee Describes His 7 Years at U.S. Site, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009,
at A10.
64. Lakhdar Boumediene was originally captured near the end of 2001. See id. His case was
not heard by the Supreme Court until December 2007. Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723.
65. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764. See also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
270 (1990) (describing the selective or functionalist approach found in the Harlan and
Frankfurter opinions in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), rather than Justice Black's plurality
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the provision would be 'impracticable and anomalous."' 66
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court listed and weighed three factors for
determining whether Mr. Boumediene and other Guantanamo detainees
were entitled to habeas corpus, in spite of, or perhaps more appropriately,
because of, their circumstances. According to the Court, the relevant factors
were "(1) the citizenship and status of [each] detainee and the adequacy of
process through which that status determination was made;" 67 (2) the
nature of the sites where the alleged constitutional breaches took place;68
and (3) "the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's
entitlement to the writ." 69
While assessing the first factor in the context of the Boumediene case, the
Court noted that although none of the petitioners were American citizens,
each of them contested their enemy combatant status determination. 70 In
addition, the determinations made for each of the detainees were done with
minimal procedural protections -falling "well short of the procedures and
adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus
review."7' Because of the inadequacy of the process they received, the
Court found that this factor weighed in favor of extending habeas.
After approaching the second factor, the nature of the sites where the
alleged constitutional breach took place, the Court held that it also weighed
in favor of the detainees. 72 Even though both the detention and
apprehension of each of the detainees occurred beyond the borders of the
United States,73 the fact that their detention was at the United States Naval
Station at Guantanamo Bay made a difference. 74 According to the Court, the
United States' control over the naval station at Guantanamo is both
absolute and indefinite,75 making it, "[in every practical sense ... [,] not
abroad," being "within the constant jurisdiction of the United States. "76
While weighing the third factor, the Court recognized "that there are
costs to holding the Suspension Clause applicable in a case of military
detention abroad,"77 but it did not consider this obstacle to be dispositive.78
The Guantanamo Bay naval station is not located in a theater of war and
there was no indication that any United States adjudications at the base
66. Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 at 759-(quoting Justice Harlan's concurrence in Reid v. Covert,-
354 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1956)).
67. Id. at 766.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 766-67.
71. Id. at 767.
72. Id. at 768-69.
73. Id. at 768 ("This is a factor that weighs against finding that [the Guantanamo detainees]
have rights under the Suspension Clause.").
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 769. Please note that the Boumediene Court did not extend this analysis to sites
that are beyond both the control and the sovereignty of the United States. This creates an
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would cause any friction with Cuba. 79 Furthermore, simple "[c]ompliance
with any judicial process requires some incremental expenditure of
resources," and that alone was not a valid excuse to withhold constitutional
rights.8 o
Since each of the factors above weighed in favor of the detainees, the
Court's ultimate holding allowed them access to the writ of habeas corpus.
However, before moving on to a more broad application of this analysis in
situations of overseas American detainees, it is important to note one more
factor implicit to the Boumediene functional test. According to Professor
Neuman:
Another factor, inherent in the functional approach but
not discussed at length in the Boumediene opinion, is a
nontextual, normative valuation of the importance of the
particular right under consideration. Kennedy emphasizes
the "centrality" of the writ of habeas corpus and the "vital"
protection for liberty that it affords. He recalls the
"fundamental" character of the (selected) rights extended
to overseas territories under the Insular Cases, and
characterizes habeas corpus as "fundamental" in his
closing paragraphs. These distinctions underline his
statement that the functional approach allowed the Court
"to use its power sparingly and where it would be most
needed." 81
This fourth factor was of significance in Boumediene, and should also be
given weight when determining the foreign reach of constitutional rights.
C. Substantive Due Process Extends Overseas to Protect U.S. Citizens
from Torture
Substantive Due Process prohibits the American government from
participating in the torture of its citizens. 82 In addition, the government
cannot act affirmatively, with deliberative indifference toward the rights of
79. Id. at 769-70.
80. Id.
81. Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 259, 273 (2009) (citations omitted).
82. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). See also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.
760, 789 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("A constitutional right is
traduced the moment torture or its close equivalents are brought to bear."); McKune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002) (finding that under the Fifth Amendment, "the Constitution clearly
protects" against "physical torture"); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986)
("[Ciertain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique
characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they
must be condemned." (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985))); United States ex rel.
Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1955) ("It is imperative that our courts severely
condemn confession by torture. ). For further information regarding the definition of
torture, see infra Part I.C.4.
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an individual, to create a foreseeable danger that would ultimately lead to a
deprivation of constitutionally protected rights-they cannot push their
citizens into situations where it is more likely than not that they will be
tortured.83 Through Boumediene's functional analysis, the constitutional
prohibitions on torture and the governmental creation of danger within the
United States should be extended to U.S. citizens84 detained by the U.S.
government while outside of the United States -protecting them from
being surrendered to local governments where it is more likely than not
that they will be a victim of torture. This Article will now apply
Boumediene's four factors to demonstrate how Substantive Due Process85
reaches beyond America's borders to protect her citizens.
While it is normally important to know the facts specific to each case in
applying Boumediene's functional analysis, this Article uses broad
generalizations to show that the constitutional protection against torture
should extend to all American citizens overseas, regardless of their
situation. To reiterate, the generalizations included in this analysis are: the
detainee in question is American; this detainee was apprehended in a
foreign State while overseas and is being held within the State of his
apprehension by American authorities; and, it is more likely than not that
the detainee will be subjected to torture if American authorities hand him
over to local authorities.
1. Factor One: Citizenship and Status
The first relevant factor to weigh in this situation is, once again, the
citizenship and status of the detainee at issue. In Boumediene, the Supreme
Court did not necessarily give any indication as to how much weight
83. Essentially, this means that the government may not permissibly toss a citizen into the
lions' den, and then claim no responsibility if the citizen is injured because of the intervention
of the lions' own actions. The government is constitutionally bound to protect its citizens from
the dangerous situations that it creates. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989); V61ez-Diaz v. Vega-Irizarry, 421 F.3d 71, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2005);
Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2005) (" Ifin situations in which -there is a
'special relationship,' an affirmative, constitutional duty to protect may arise when the state 'so
restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same
time fails to provide for his basic human needs.' . . . This court has recognized that this
relationship, and thus a constitutional duty, may exist when the individual is incarcerated or is
involuntarily committed to the custody of the state.") (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200).
Huffman v. Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he danger-creation plaintiff
must demonstrate, at the very least, that the state acted affirmatively, and with deliberate
indifference, in creating a foreseeable danger to the plaintiff, leading to the deprivation of the
plaintiff's constitutional rights.") (citations omitted).
84. Once again, this Article's scope is limited to American citizens as they are held
overseas. See Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[T]here can be no
substantive due process objection to the order removing Enwonwu. The state-created danger
theory argument fails because an alien has no constitutional substantive due process right not
to be removed from the United States, nor a right not to be removed from the United States to
a particular place.") (emphasis added).
85. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723.
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American citizenship is to be given in the analysis. 86 However, it did note
that while the detainees-at-issue were not Americans, they did contest their
status as "enemy aliens."87 That fact put them on a different plane than
foreign detainees who had not contested their status, weighing in their
favor.88
Nevertheless, the facts of one of Boumediene's precedent cases allow for
clearer conclusions to be drawn. In Reid v. Covert,89 two American wives
were convicted for the murder of their soldier husbands while they were
living overseas on American bases. 90 In both cases, the wives were tried by
a military court-martial instead of a civilian court.91 Consequently, each
wife petitioned the Supreme Court, claiming that her Fifth and Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by a jury had been violated. 92 Because the
Court's decision came down as a plurality, its holding is limited by the
treatment given in the concurring opinions of Justices Frankfurter 93 and
Harlan94 - treatment that was later adopted by the Court in Boumediene.95
For the plurality, the question at issue was not just whether the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments applied overseas, but whether they should apply in the
particular circumstances, that is to say, to Americans. 96 In light of the case's
holding, it is easy to adopt the position that citizenship weighed in each of
the military wives' favor.97 Consequently, the American citizenship of this
Article's hypothetical detainee factors in his favor.
2. Factor Two: The Site of the Constitutional Breach
The second factor to evaluate is the nature of the site where an alleged
breach of constitutionally protected rights took place. In the case of our
hypothetical detainee, this is the sole factor that does not weigh in his favor.
86. Id. at 765-68.
87. Id. at 766.
88. Id. at 766-67 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950)).
89. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). This was, in fact, the first time that "the Supreme Court had ever
found a violation of the Bill of Rights in extraterritorial action taken by the government against
a citizen." Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution after Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 259,264 (2009).
90. Mrs. Covert was living with her husband on an Air Force Base in England when she
killed him. Reid, 354 U.S. at 3. Mrs. Smith "killed her husband, an army officer, at a post in
Japan where she was living with him." Id. at 4.
91. Id. at 3, no. 4.
92. Id. at 5.
93. See id. at 41-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
94. See id. at 65-78 (Harlan, J., concurring).
95. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 761 (2008) ("[Tlhe two concurring Justices [in Reid]
distinguished [In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891)] from the cases before them, not on the basis of
the citizenship of the petitioners, but on practical considerations that made jury trial a more
feasible option for them than it was for the petitioner in Ross."). See also Richard Murphy &
Afsheen John Rasdan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 434
(2009) ("In essence, Justice Kennedy took Justice Harlan's Reid concurrence and made it the
law.").
96. Reid, 354 U.S. at 76 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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To reiterate, the only details provided concerning his apprehension,
detention, and transfer are that they all occur within the same foreign State.
According to Boumediene, the foreign breach of an alleged right seems to cut
against an ultimate extension of the Constitution98 unless that foreign area
is controlled by unhindered American authority.99
However, failing in this single factor does not eliminate the opportunity
for an extension of constitutional rights. Recalling Reid v. Covert,
constitutional protections were extended to one of the accused military
wives that American authorities had detained (and tried) while still on
English soil.100 The relationship between the United States and England
during the mid-1900s is nothing like the current American domination of
Guantanamo Bay. The agreement between the United States and the United
Kingdom during Reid did not even give the U.S. absolute and indefinite
control over its own citizens, much less the territory where its citizens were
located. In fact, their agreement only granted "jurisdiction in respect of
criminal offences which may be committed in the United Kingdom by
members of [the United States Forces] . . . during the continuance of the
conflict against [their] common enemies."10 In addition, if the U.S. decided it
was not going to exercise its prosecutorial jurisdiction, British authorities
were permitted to exercise the "jurisdiction of the courts of the United
Kingdom."102 Unlike Boumediene, the situs of the breach of Mrs. Covert's
rights was not under absolute and indefinite American control.
Consequently, her favorable ruling by the Supreme Court shows that
failing on this single factor will not defeat our hypothetical detainee's case.
3. Factor Three: Examining the Practical Obstacles
Third, it is necessary to consider the practical obstacles inherent in
resolving our detainee's right to Due Process. The most important obstacle
here is that the judiciary's interference in the Executive's decision to
transfer a detainee might undermine the government's ability to speak with
one voice in matters of foreign affairs. For example, a pragmatic Executive
that makes an intentional decision to overlook another State's torture
record in order to cultivate its relationship with that State in the pursuit of
other goals may not appreciate a meddling Judiciary. This view is well-
expressed in Justice Clarence Thomas' dissenting opinion in Hamdi.1os
According to Justice Thomas, the Founders specifically vested the Executive
with the responsibility and power to act alone in these matters because they
98. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768 ("[Tihe sites of [the Boumediene detainees'] apprehension
and detention are technically outside the sovereign territory of the United States ... [Tihis is a
factor that weighs against finding they have rights under the Suspension Clause.").
99. See id. at 2260-61.
100. 351 U.S. at 488.
101. Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland respecting jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by
armed forces, 57 Stat. 1193, Ill (Jul. 27, 1942) (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 112.
103. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,579-89 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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recognized that "the structural advantages of a unitary Executive are
essential" in that domain. 0 4 For example, lower courts have recognized that
second-guessing the political branches could "render agreements with
foreign nations contingent" and "chill the frank discussions with foreign
governments that are essential to diplomatic relations." 05 The Supreme
Court touched lightly on this issue, specifically in the case of Executive
torture determinations, in Munaf.0 6
Nevertheless, even if the Framers intended that certain matters rest
within the jurisdiction of one unitary branch of government, it was also
"the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our
political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three
coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty." 0 7 Indeed,
since the Founding, "[w]hatever power the United States Constitution
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with
enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role
for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake."108 For
example, even though "courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude
upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security
affairs,"109 a tradition dating back to the Civil War shows that courts may
interfere in the affairs of the unitary Executive in order to protect a citizen's
individual rights."0 Contemporary courts have also come to the same
conclusion, finding that the risk of injury to an individual can outweigh any
harm to the government caused by judicial interference."'
Consequently, any practical obstacles inherent to prohibiting the
104. Id. at 580 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
105. Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F. Supp. 2d 188,199 (D.D.C. 2005).
106. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) ("The Judiciary is not suited to second-
guess such determinations-determinations that would require federal courts to pass
judgment on foreign justice systems and undermine the Government's ability to speak with
one voice in this area."). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted this to mandate
complete deference to the Executive branch. Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 514 (D.C. Cir.
2009) ("Under Munaf, however, the district court may not question the Government's
determination that a potential recipient country is not likely to torture a detainee." (citation
omitted)).
107. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1988).
108. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,536 (2004).
109. Dept. of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988).
110. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 62 (1866) (holding that the trial of
normal citizens in military courts is unconstitutional when civilian courts are still operating).
Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (holding that the President could
not unilaterally suspend the writ to habeas corpus to the disadvantage of citizens).
111. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Bush, No. Civ. A. 04-2035(GK), 2005 WL 774843, at *3 (D.D.C.
Apr. 4, 2005) ("Such a minimal consequence [to the government] does not outweigh the
imminent threats [to the petitioner]."); Abdah v. Bush, No. Civ. A. 04-1254(HHK), 2005 WL
711814, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005) ("While the injunction Petitioners seek might restrict or
delay Respondents with respect to one aspect of managing Petitioners' detention, such a
consequence does not outweigh the imminent threat facing Petitioners with respect to the
entirety of their claims before the court."); Kurnaz v. Bush, Nos. Civ. 04-1135(ESH), Civ. 05-
0392(ESH), 2005 WL 839542, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2005); Al-Joudi v. Bush, No. Civ.A.05-
301(GK), 2005 WL 774847, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2005) ("In weighing the respective hardships
imposed upon the parties, the balance clearly tilts in favor of Petitioners.").
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transfer of an American detainee into the custody of likely torturers are not
insurmountable because the judiciary was in fact designed to that end.
Therefore, Boumediene's third factor also weighs in favor of the
extraterritorial application of the Constitution to protect citizens from
torture.
4. Factor Four: The Value of a Citizen's Right to Be Free from Torture
The fourth and final consideration, or the "normative valuation of the
importance of the particular right under consideration," 112 weighs heavily
in favor of extending Due Process rights to protect detainees from being
surrendered to torturers. In fact, there are few rights that have as deep a
foundation within the common law as the right of each citizen to be free
from government imposed torture.
As early as 1215 A.D., when England adopted its system of trial by jury,
the very justification or purpose of torture began to recede.113 Indeed, by
the late 15th-century, Chancellor Sir John Fortescue found that "a practice
so inhuman [as torture] deserves not indeed to be called a law, but the high
road to hell." 114 By the 17th century, English common law judges had
arrived at a consensus concerning the use of torture, as evidenced by the
case of John Felton.115 In that case, Felton had been indicted for the
assassination of the Duke of Buckingham and the Privy Council was
threatening to put him to the question on the rack in order to discover his
accomplices.216 However, because the Council could not determine
"whether by the law of the land they could justify the putting him to the
rack," the King posed this question to the judges at common law.117 The
judges unanimously decided to forbid the Council from using torture,
finding that Felton "ought not by the law to be tortured by the rack, for no
such punishment is known or allowed by our law." 118
This same consensus against the use of torture was fully imported by
the American Framers and later enshrined in the Bill of Rights. The Fifth
Amendment, for example, which bars self-incrimination, was understood in
part as "a ban on torture and a security for the criminally accused."119 The
112. Neuman, supra note 81, at 273.
113. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 73 (1976).
114. JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE, A TREATISE IN COMMENDATION OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 73 (Francis Gregor, trans., Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1874) (1470).
115. Rex v. Felton, 3 Howell's State Trials 369 (1628).
116. Id. at 371.
117. Id.
118. Id. See also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 321
(1769) ("[Tihe judges, being consulted, declared unanimously, to their own honour and the
honour of the English law, that no such proceeding was allowable by the laws of England.");
EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING
HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 35 (1797) (" [T]here is
no law to warrant tortures in this land ... And there is no one opinion in our books, or judicial
record (that we have seen and remember) for the maintenance of tortures or torments.").
119. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 430 (1968); see Akhil Reed Amar & Ren~e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
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Eighth Amendment, which specifically prohibits the use of cruel and
unusual punishment, was also specifically aimed at "proscribing 'tortures'
and other 'barbarous' methods of punishment." 20 Indeed, it is now well
agreed that the "use of torture or its equivalent ... violates an individual'sfundamental right to liberty of the person."121 Consequently, the right to be
free from torture is certainly fundamental, and should be given significant
weight in any functional analysis for the extraterritorial extension of
constitutional rights.
In conclusion, Justice Kennedy's functional analysis in Boumediene
weighs heavily in favor of extending Substantive Due Process beyond U.S.
borders to protect American citizens, who are in the custody of the United
States government, from transfer to likely torture. Three of Justice
Kennedy's factors (the citizenship of the claimant, the cost of extending the
right in question, and the fundamentality of the right) weigh significantly,
if not completely, in favor of extending the right. In addition, the only
factor to weigh against the extra-territorial extension of Due Process is the
situs of the alleged breach of the constitutional right, assuming here that
this breach would be outside of the United States and in a territory unlike
the Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay. Nevertheless, as shown in the
foregoing analysis, this sole factor should not prevent the ultimate
extension of the Constitution to protect Americans while abroad from being
sent by their own government into the hands of torturers.
Although Substantive Due Process alone is a strong reason to forbid the
U.S. government from transferring citizens in its custody into the hands of
likely torturers, it is not the only one. The United States' ratification of the
Convention Against Torture has also made such a transfer contrary to
federal law.
II. U.S. LAw FORBIDS THE SURRENDER OF DETAINEES TO TORTURERS
In this Part, this Article will address the ways in which federal law
should apply to forbid the U.S. government from transferring expatriate
American citizens into the custody of foreign governments that are likely to
torture them. It will do so by first analyzing the relevant American law,
and, by interpreting the language and intentions behind it, break past any
ambiguity to show that it forbids the transfer of Americans to any
custodian that would likely torture them. Then, using the Charming Betsy
doctrine,122 this Part will show that even if interpreting the language and
intent of the law does not allow for a definite conclusion against intra-State
transfers, interpreting the statute in the light of international law certainly
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 857, 927 (1995) ("The Founding-era
history of the self-incrimination slogan in America was bound up with concerns about
torture.").
120. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976).
121. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 796 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
122. See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
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would.
A. The FARR Act and the Convention Against Torture
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment was signed by the United States on
April 18, 1988, and then ratified in 1994.123 Among the many goals of the
Convention was the eradication of torture by forbidding the practice of
"expel[ling], return[ing] ('refouler') or extradite[ing] a person to another
State where there are substantial groundS124 for believing that he would be
in danger of being subjected to torture."125 Currently, the Convention
maintains its status as American federal law through the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause,126 as well as its enacting statutes, which include the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (the FARR Act).127 In
fact, it is through the FARR Act that the Senate executed the Convention's
prohibition of transfers in the face of likely torture.128 In addition, it is
through the FARR Act that individuals who contest their impending
transfers because of the likelihood of torture, would petition for relief.
Therefore, this Article will specifically address the reach of the FARR Act to
expatriate American citizens who are threatened with transfers to an
authority that would more likely than not subject them to torture.
1. Difficulties with a FARR Act Claim
Before moving on to address the interpretation of the FARR Act and
how it applies to the transfers relevant to this Article, it is necessary to
determine whether the FARR Act may even be used to contest an intra-
territorial transfer. The problem is that some courts have interpreted the
FARR Act to only allow persons to contest transfers in a petition for review
123. Convention Against Torture, supra note 20.
124. As noted earlier in this Article, in the Senate's reservations to the Convention, it
interprets this term to mean "more likely than not." See supra note 20.
125. Convention Against Torture, supra note 20, at art. 3.
126. U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or .which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
127. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARR Act), Pub. L. No. 150-
277, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2006) (United States Policy with Respect to
Involuntary Return of Persons in Danger of Subjection to Torture)). Other implementing
statutes from the Convention Against Torture are found in the Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§
2340-2340B (2006). When the United States became a party to the Convention, it was with the
reservation that articles 1 through 16 of the Convention were non-self-executing. Jane C. Kim,
Note, Nonrefoulement under the Convention Against Torture: How U.S. Allowances for Diplomatic
Assurances Contravene Treaty Obligations and Federal Law, 32 BROOK, J. INT'L L. 1227, 1235-36
(2007).
128. The language of the statute in question says that "it shall be the policy of the United
States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a
country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of
being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United
States." FARR Act § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-882.
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of a final order of removal. 129 This view comes from section 2242(d) of the
Act, which states that "nothing in this section shall be construed as
providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under
the Convention or this section . . . except as part of the review of a final
order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act."130 In spite of the Act's language, many courts have
permitted habeas corpus petitions to challenge transfers13 1 under the
Supreme Court's decision in INS v. St. Cyr.132 According to St. Cyr,
jurisdiction-stripping provisions in federal statutes do not strip courts of
jurisdiction to decide habeas claims unless they do so explicitly.133
This issue is further complicated by the fact that, as of 2005, Congress
passed additional laws which expand the definition of "jurisdiction" to
include habeas claims.134 Some courts have found that this closes off the St.
Cyr reasoning. 135
Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether prospective transferees are
completely barred from obtaining relief under the FARR Act. First, the
Supreme Court has not definitively made a pronouncement, even when it
could have done so in Munaf In addition, some scholars still believe that
the FARR Act is enforceable in spite of the latest jurisdiction-stripping acts
of Congress.136 At any rate, this is an issue that has yet to be completely
settled and this Article functions based on the assumption that a non-
immigrant detainee may still use the FARR Act to challenge his transfer.
2. Interpreting the "Plain Language"
Those who resist the idea that the FARR Act protects American citizens
129. See, e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 514-15 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (limiting FARR Act
claims to challenges to a final order of removal in immigration cases).
130. FARR Act § 2242(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
131. See, e.g., Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1182 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that courts may
consider habeas corpus claims under the Convention); Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 193
(1st Cir. 2003); Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 2003); Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft,
342 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435,441 (9th Cir. 2003).
132. See 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
133. See id. at 314.
134. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2006) ("For purposes of this chapter, in every provision that
limits or eliminates judicial review or jurisdiction to review, the terms 'judicial review' and
'jurisdiction to review' include habeas corpus review pursuant to section 2241 of title 28, or
any other habeas corpus provision, sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and review pursuant
to any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory).").
135. See Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 674-76 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Except in the context
of immigration proceedings, § 2242(d) flatly prohibits courts from 'consider[ing] ... claims'
raised under the CAT or the FARR Act. This preclusion plainly encompasses consideration of
CAT and FARR Act claims on habeas review.") (alterations in original); see also Omar v. Geren,
689 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2009).
136. Steve Vladeck, Munaf's Mixed Bag: FARRA, the Rule ofNon-Inquiry, and the Significance
of Belbacha, PRAWFSBLAWG, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/ 2008/06/munafs-
mixed-ba.html (June 13, 2008, 11:15 PM) ("Can an individual held as a non-immigration
detainee use FARRA, and its implementation of Article 3 of CAT, to prevent his transfer ...
from U.S. to Iraqi custody while in Iraq, as in Omar and Munaf? . . . The answer may
ultimately be no.... It may ultimately be yes (which I think it is).").
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who are already located within the State of their planned transfer look
specifically to the language of the Act, and the Convention that it executes,
to justify their claims. 37 For example, according to Chief Justice Roberts,
"the [FARR] Act speaks to situations where a detainee is being 'return[ed]'
to 'a country.' . . . It is not settled that the Act addresses the transfer of an
individual located in [a country] to the [g]overnment [of that country];
arguably such an individual is not being 'returned' to 'a country'-he is
already there."138
In spite of Chief Justice Roberts's plain language interpretation to the
contrary, plain language can also provide a much more encompassing
interpretation of the law at issue, presenting a wider range of ambiguity
than the Chief Justice perceived. Once that ambiguity appears, rules of
construction require an examination of the Act's legislative intent in order
to draw conclusions about its anticipated application.139 Unfortunately,
there is a paucity of relevant legislative history to glean from for the
relevant sections of the FARR Act.
As a result, it becomes necessary to look to the treaty that the Act was
meant to execute - the Convention Against Torture - as well as its travaux
prdparatoire (or official records), to determine the meaning of the Act.
Opening up the interpretive analysis to these additional documents
ultimately leads to the conclusion that the Act was meant to eliminate all
forms of torture and therefore prohibit detainee transfers any time that
torture is an issue -even when that transfer of authority happens within a
State. Moreover, even if the law's language unambiguously omits the
possibility of an intra-State transfer of power, because such an
interpretation would cause absurd results in light of the Convention's
provisions, that omission cannot be interpreted as intended by Congress.140
a. "To a country." The FARR Act language that Chief Justice Roberts
cites states that "it shall be the policy of the United States not to expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a
country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person
would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the
person is physically present in the United States." 41 At first blush, it is easy
to agree with the Chief Justice's interpretation of the language. However,
the words "to a country" admit an alternative interpretation. Because Chief
Justice Roberts focuses his attention on the location of the detainee, he reads
137. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 704 n.6 (2008).
138. Id.
139. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONsTRUCTION § 45:5 (7th ed. 2007).
140. Universal Const. Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Com'n, 182 F.3d
726, 729 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that intent can be expressed by omitting certain language).
141. FARR Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006) (emphasis added). According to rules of
interpretation, "the construction of a treaty by a political department of government, though
not conclusive, is nevertheless given weight." 1A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
32:9 (7th ed. 2007). This creates a need to interpret the Convention Against Torture's meaning
through the congressional enactment (the FARR Act) which establishes measures for the
Convention's enforcement because the FARR Act is essentially what becomes judicially
enforceable in the United States, not the Convention Against Torture.
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the word "country" to signify a place, which is only one of many acceptable
definitions. 142 "Country" may also refer to an entity or sovereign, signifying
a nation or referring to the authority of the State itself.143 This second
definition is also an appropriate fit for the phrase "to a country" -meaning
that the United States cannot transfer a detainee to the authority of another
State when it has knowledge that the sovereign authority of that State
engages in the torture of its detainees.
Then again, this alternative interpretation encounters some difficulty
when readers continue past the phrase "to a country" to encounter the
prepositional phrase "in which." While the first preposition "to" can be
used with both locations and entities, "in" connotes inclusion, referring
only to a location.144 Nevertheless, although that preposition does not
necessarily correspond with the authority definition of State, it may still fit
if sovereignty also implies territorial sovereignty, since territorial
sovereignty is at the heart of the Westphalia System.145 Therefore, while the
preposition indicates that "country" may only connote a location within the
FARR Act, the word's multiple meanings may allow for additional
interpretations.
b. "To another State." The same issue is encountered when examining
the corresponding language in the Convention Against Torture. According
to the Convention, "[n]o State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."146
Again, when the Convention speaks of a transfer "to another State," the
word "State" in this context could mean both a location1 47 as well as an
authority.148 The argument behind the authority definition gains additional
ground due to the fact that the sentence employs that definition earlier on,
declaring the imperative "No State Party shall." Yet, just as in the FARR
Act, the second time the Convention employs the word "State," the word is
immediately followed by the conjunction "where," which once again
implies location.
Consequently, it appears that Chief Justice Roberts' focus on the law's
language brings no immediate or definitive answer as to the Act's meaning.
3. Interpreting the "Plain Intentions": The Spirit of the Law
Generally, the United States Supreme Court has held that "the meaning
of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which
142. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 286 (11th ed. 2004) ("[a] political state
or nation or its territory.").
143. Id.
144. Id. at 627.
145. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1161-62 (5th ed. 2003).
146. Convention Against Torture, supra note 20, art. 3 (emphasis added).
147. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1218 (11th ed. 2004) ("[A] politically
organized body of people usually occupying a definite territory. . .") (emphasis added).
148. Id. (defining State as a "political organization").
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the act is framed." 149 Courts are supposed to attempt to enforce the literal
meaning of a statute's language, under the assumption that it embodies the
intent of its drafters.150
Nevertheless, the system recognizes that drafters are not perfect. It
understands that ambiguities may exist within a writing.151 Because courts
are grounded in reality, canons of statutory construction allow them to take
effective measures to ensure that the intent of the law is preserved, in spite
of flaws in the language. For example, courts may interpret a statute so as
to better adopt its intent when a drafting error or ambiguity would cause
unintended or absurd consequences in its application. 152 In looking to
preserve that intent, courts "consider the history of the subject matter
involved, the end to be attained ... and the purpose to be accomplished."15 3
Even though a strict interpretation of the FARR Act's language
(including those troublesome prepositions and conjunctions) may help to
provide meaning to the Act, an interpretation along those lines rejects both
the law's purpose as well as the expectations of the Convention's
signatories: the worldwide eradication of torture. 154 In addition, any
application of the FARR Act that allows for a "loophole" permitting torture
would create absurd results in the context of the rest of the Act and its
inspirational documents.
In order to understand the true intent and purpose of the Act, it is
necessary to look past alternative definitions and function words and
examine the history behind the Act as well as the Act's application.
a. The FARR Act's inspirational documents: The Convention and its travaux.
The drafters of and signatories to the Convention Against Torture
ultimately intended to create an agreement that would eliminate torture.155
The international declarations and agreements that the drafters used as a
149. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
150. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 138, § 46:1 ("When the
intention of the legislature is so apparent from the face of the statute that there can be no
question as to its meaning, there is no room for construction.").
151. "Ambiguity exists when a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more different senses." Id. § 45:2.
152. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Westgate Partners, Ltd., 937 F.2d 526, 531 (10th Cir.
1991). United States v. Maung, 267 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that the one
circumstance in which a court may properly look beyond the plain language of a statute of
which the language is clear is where giving effect to the language used by Congress would
lead to a clearly absurd result); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985) ("Only the
most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history will justify a
departure from that language.").
153. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 138, § 45:5 (citing Garcia v.
U.S., 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984)).
154. See Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 5, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1984/72 (Mar. 9,1984).
155. See id. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 1 (1988) ("The principal aim of the
Convention is to strengthen the existing prohibition of [torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
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foundation for the Convention provide a strong base for this argument. The
Convention specifically recognizes the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as
significant influences in its drafting.156 While neither of those documents
pertained exclusively to torture, each specifically mandates that "[nlo one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment"157 and bases its reasoning on the "inherent dignity" of the
human person.1ss Their language is absolute and explicit -no human being
may ever be subjected to torture.
The next important document to consider is the Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.159 This Declaration was
approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 9,
1975 and ostensibly began the years-long process of drafting the
Convention.16 0 While providing a foundation for the Convention,161 the
Torture Declaration focuses entirely on torture. Its detailed treatment of the
subject can be summed up on the same absolute and explicit terms as the
Human Rights Declaration and the ICCPR: "Any act of torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is an offence to
human dignity"1 6 2 and " [njo State may permit or tolerate" any such acts.163
Notwithstanding the clarity of the language, and the binding nature of
the previous documents,164 it appears that the U.N. General Assembly was
still uncertain as to whether any convention could definitively stamp out
156. Convention Against Torture, supra note 20, at pmbl.
157. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, art. 5, G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. Doc A/810
at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7,
Annex to G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR R. Supp. (No. 16), at 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
158. UDHR supra note 157, at pmbl; ICCPR supra note 157, at pmbl.
159. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX) (Dec. 9,
1975) [hereinafter Torture Declaration].
160. Hans Danelius, Former justice of the Supreme Court of Sweden, Audiovisual Library
of Int'l Law, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Introduction, Dec. 10,1984, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/catcidtp/
catcidtp.html ("The Torture Convention was the result of many years' work, initiated soon
after the adoption of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.").
161. Convention Against Torture, supra note 20, at preamb.
162. Torture Declaration, supra note 159, at art. 2.
163. Id. arts. 3, 4.
164. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a treaty and therefore
explicitly binds its parties. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although not a treaty,
still has a binding effect on States, having become an authoritative document expressing
international customary law. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d. Cir. 1980) ("It has
been observed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights no longer fits into the
dichotomy of 'binding treaty' against 'non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an
authoritative statement of the international community ... Indeed, several commentators have
concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto part of binding, customary
international law.") (quoting E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
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torture. Indeed, on the same day that the Torture Declaration was made,
the General Assembly recognized that "further and sustained efforts are
necessary to protect under all circumstances the basic human right to be free
from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." 65 Moreover, in an effort to make "further international
efforts. . . to ensure adequate protection for all against torture," 66 the
General Assembly put the Commission on Human Rights to work, asking it
to identify necessary steps to secure an international ban on torture,167 and
then requesting that it draft the Torture Convention to that end.168
Ultimately, the early purpose of the Convention is clear: the worldwide
elimination of torture.
b. The all-encompassing nature of the Convention. If the Convention's
predecessor documents do not adequately establish the intent behind the
FARR Act, then the absolute and all-encompassing language of the
Convention itself should certainly expose the absurdity of an interpretation
that would leave any loopholes to allow for torture.
First, while the Convention reprises the language of the earlier torture-
banning agreements by making similar statements concerning its basis in
human dignityl 69 and stating a general rule against torture,170 it also goes
further by unequivocally eliminating any possible justification for torture
within each signatory's jurisdiction. According to the Convention, States
may not rationalize torture practices because of "a state of war or a threat of
war."17' Nor may States torture someone because of "internal political
instability or ... public emergency."1 72 Neither are individuals justified in
165. G.A. Res. 3453 (Dec. 9, 1975) (emphasis added).
166. Id.
167. Id. 12(a).
168. G.A. Res. 32/62, l1 (Dec. 8, 1977). It is also very interesting to note the urgency with
which the General Assembly treated the issue of torture, and thus the drafting of the
Convention Against Torture. As the drafting process began to lag, the General Assembly made
repeated calls for its rapid completion. Secretariat, Report on the Sixth Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1 (Aug. 25-Sept. 5,
1980) available at http://www.asc4l.com/6th%20UN%20Congress%20on%20the%20
Prevention%20of%20Crime/024%20ACONF.87.14.Rev.1 %20Sixth%20United%20Nations%20C
ongress%200n%20the%20Prevention%20of%20Crime%2Oand%2Othe%2OTreatment%20of%20
Offenders.pdf (stating that the draft convention, "including the study of adequate procedures
for ensuring the proper the implementation of the future convention on torture . . . . should be
finalized at the earliest possible time"). See also G.A. Res. 37/193, 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/193
(Dec. 18, 1982) ("Requests the Commission on Human Rights to complete as a matter of
highest priority . . . the drafting of a convention on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.") (italics omitted); G.A. Res. 38/119, 112, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/38/119 (Dec. 16, 1983) ("Requests the Commission on Human Rights to complete, . ..
as a matter of the highest priority, the drafting of a convention against torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, with a view to submitting a draft, including
provisions for the effective implementation of the future convention, to the General Assembly
at its [next] session.").
169. Convention Against Torture supra note 20, annex ("Recognizing that [inalienable] rights
derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.").
170. Id. arts. 2-5.
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the practice of torture based on "an order from a superior officer or a public
authority."' 7s Quite simply, "no exceptional circumstances whatsoever . . .
may be invoked as a justification of torture."174
Furthermore, the Convention does not merely regulate the domestic
behavior of each of its signatories-it goes further to require States to
engage in international behavior that affirms an absolute intolerance of
torture. For example, States cannot be accessories to torture by sending an
individual "to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."175 In
addition, when acts or attempts at torture do occur,176 each State is required
to exercise jurisdiction over the perpetrators of the crime.177 The Torture
Convention is unlike many other international agreements in that, instead
of restricting criminal jurisdiction to the location where the crime
occurred,178 the nationality of the alleged torturer,179 or the nationality of
173. Id. art. 2(3).
174. Id. art. 2(2).
175. Id. art. 3(1).
176. Id. art. 4(1) (noting that this rule extends to both completed acts as well as attempts at
torture, and any accomplice in those acts).
177. Id. art. 5. Note that the language in this article is not precatory, but imperative. The
Convention does not say that each State Party may take measures to establish jurisdiction. It
says that "each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish
jurisdiction." Id. art. 5(1) (emphasis added).
178. This is also known as the territorial principle. SHAW, supra note 145, at 579-84 (stating
that this principle reflects the well-founded concept "that a country should be able to
prosecute for offenses committed upon its soil"). The Convention, even though allowing for
universal jurisdiction, lists this principle first as one of the methods of obtaining jurisdiction
over torture crimes. Convention Against Torture, supra note 20, at art. 5(1)(a) (stating that a State
must take measures to exercise jurisdiction "[wihen the offences are committed in any territory
under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State"). There appears to
be little controversy surrounding the use of this principle because of its direct tie to territorial
sovereignty and because of its long history. For many years, territorial jurisdiction was the
only source of legitimate criminal jurisdiction over anything except for the high seas. See IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (5th ed. 1998).
179. This is also known as the nationality principle. SHAW, supra note 145, at 584 ("Since
every state possesses sovereignty and jurisdictional powers and since every state must consist
of a collection of individual human beings, it is essential that a link between the two be legally
established"). The Convention lists this principle second as a method for obtaining jurisdiction
over torture crimes. Convention Against Torture, supra note 20, at art. 5(1)(b) (stating that a State
must take measures to exercise jurisdiction "[w]hen the alleged offender is a national of that
State").
The United States Supreme Court has recognized this principle for almost two centuries.
The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) ("The laws of no nation can justly extend
beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens."); Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950) ("[c]itizenship as a head of jurisdiction and a ground of protection was
old when Paul invoked it in his appeal to Caesar."). In addition, several federal statutes grant
U.S. Courts jurisdiction based on the nationality of the offender. These offenses include,
among others, perjury, espionage, and tax evasion. Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The
Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 41, 53 & nn.79-81 (1992) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988) (perjury); id. §§ 793-794 (espionage); 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006) (tax
evasion)). This, however, does not mean that the principle has been universally recognized or
applied by the international community. See Watson, supra at 41 (discussing the United States'
past reluctance to employ the nationality principle); Edmund S. McAlister, Note, The Hydraulic
Pressure of Vengeance: United States v. Alvarez-Machain and the Case for a Justifiable Abduction,
[Vol. 1544
26
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol15/iss1/2
2012] Tying OffAl Loose Ends 45
the victim, 180 the Convention grants its signatories universal jurisdiction
and requires all of them to participate in the prosecution of torture.181
43 DEPAUL L. REV. 449, 457-58 (1994) (noting that nations have taken different approaches to
jurisdiction based on an offender's nationality).
180. The authority to assert jurisdiction over crimes through the nationality of a victim is
known as the passive personality principle. SHAW, supra note 145, at 589-91. ("Under this
principle, a state may claim jurisdiction to try an individual for offences committed abroad
which have affected or will affect nationals of the state."). The Torture Convention lists this
third among the methods of asserting jurisdiction over torture crimes. Convention Against
Torture, supra note 20, at art. 5(1)(c) (stating that a State must take measures to exercise
jurisdiction "when the victim is a national of that State").
While the passive personality principle finds its place in the Convention Against Torture,
it is a principle that generates quite a bit of controversy. See HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN
WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 231 (1993) (noting that passive personality has "long been an
extremely controversial principle"); John G. McCarthy, The Passive Personality Principle and Its
Use in Combating International Terrorism, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 298 (1990); Research in
International Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School: Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 443, 578-79 (Supp. 1935). According to the Commentary of
Section 402 of Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, the
passive personality principle "has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but
it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's
nationals by reason of their nationality, or to assassination of a state's diplomatic
representatives or other officials." RESTATFMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. g. (1987).
181. Convention Against Torture, supra note 20, at art. 5(2) ("Each State Party shall likewise
take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases
where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not
extradite him .... ). Under the universality principle, "each and every state has jurisdiction to
try particular offences." SHAW, supra note 145, at 592. Because of sovereignty issues, the
exercise of universal jurisdiction tends to be rare. Without a treaty, it is generally only
exercised in cases of piracy and war crimes. Id. at 593-97. A number of treaties, such as the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, and the International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages are notable extensions of universal jurisdiction
through accords. Id. at 599-602. The drafters of the Torture Convention specifically looked to
those three treaties as models for its own conferral of universal jurisdiction. Comm'n on
Human Rights, Rep. of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72, 132
(Mar. 9, 1984).
In ratifying this treaty, the Senate included among its reservations that "it is the
understanding of the United States that article 14 requires a State Party to provide a private
right of action for damages only for acts of torture committed in territory under the
jurisdiction of that State Party." Convention Against Torture, supra note 20, at U.S. Reservations
11.3, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=
2&mtdsg-no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en. Interestingly, such a reservation is arguably illicit.
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, reservations which are
incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty are illegitimate. Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties art. 19, May 23,1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. If the Convention's purpose was to
expand the prosecutorial jurisdiction for torturers to a universal level, then this reservation
would be contrary to the treaty's purpose. Yet, the effect of an illicit reservation is not the
nullity of the reservation but the nullity of that State's adhesion to the Covenant. In addition,
since the U.S. was permitted to adhere to the Convention without the protest and objection of
other Signatories, it appears that the reservation stands as it is. Nevertheless, this reservation
does not mean that the U.S. is prohibited from exercising universal jurisdiction to provide a
forum for claims by aliens for torture occurring elsewhere. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos
Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992), appeal after remand, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.
1994), appeal after remand, 94 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, even though it is not
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In sum, the language contained in the Convention, and the documents
that inspired it, are sufficient to establish the intent of the FARR Act's
drafters. However, any uncertainty that might remain is quickly dispelled
by the absurd results that ensue from an interpretation that does not limit
intra-State transfers.
c. The absurdity of the loophole. According to Chief Justice Roberts, it is
questionable whether the FARR Act, and consequently the Convention
Against Torture, even applies to situations where an individual is already
located within the country to whose authority he would be transferred.182
However, placing this interpretation of the Act within the context of the
rest of the Convention's provisions creates absurd results -lending more
weight to an expansive interpretation of the Act.
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical: the United States
exercises a broad police power within, and with the permission of, State X.
As a result, State X allows the U.S. to both arrest and detain individuals
alleged to have committed crimes within State X, subject to their eventual
prosecution within State X's system. In addition, it is a well-known fact that
when State X obtains custody of alleged criminals, it tortures them to obtain
confessions. While on patrol in State X, the U.S. finds and arrests Abe, an
American citizen, who was in the process of committing a crime.
Eventually, State X requests that the U.S. give custody of Abe to the
authorities of State X.
If the FARR Act does not prohibit Abe's transfer, the U.S., considering
issues of comity and sovereignty, would likely surrender custody of Abe to
State X. However, under this interpretation of the law, although the U.S.
did not have authority to refuse to transfer custody of Abe, it would
immediately gain the authority to prosecute those responsible for his
imminent torture (i.e., State X) because Abe is an American citizen and
because the Convention Against Torture grants universal jurisdiction to
prosecute torture.183 To reach this conclusion, one would have to read the
Convention as only addressing a State's post hoc authority to punish
torture -ignoring the Convention's efforts to protect victims before their
abuse by prohibiting States from engaging in torture or from transferring
individuals to places where there is a substantial risk of torture.
Consequently, while Chief Justice Roberts' interpretation perhaps
criminal prosecution that the Convention calls for, courts of the United States have permitted
universal jurisdiction for private causes of action against perpetrators of torture under the
Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789. E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing
Paraguayan citizens to bring suit against another Paraguayan for the torture and death of a
family member, even though all acts of torture occurred in Paraguay). Just like the passive
personality principle, the universality principle also provokes a significant amount of
controversy. For further reading on this debate, compare Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of
Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2001, at 86, 92 (stating that, among other things,
universal jurisdiction will lead to a slippery slope where foreign courts compete politically
with each other, issuing competing indictments that violate sacrosanct principles of
sovereignty while also diluting their own authority), with Kenneth Roth, The Casefor Universal
Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 150.
182. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 703 n.6 (2008).
183. See supra note 181.
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expresses doubt in a manner that leaves the question open for further
review, any narrow interpretation that preserves the loophole would be
tremendously incongruous with the overall intent of the Act's inspirational
documents. It is irrational to think that a Convention which attempts to
eliminate torture would only grant "protection" to someone in Abe's
hypothetical situation after having been tortured. Such an absurd outcome
hardly seems to fit with the provisions of, or the intent behind, the Act.
B. Interpreting the FARR Act in Light of Customary International Law
Even if arguments concerning the intentions behind the Convention
and its implementing legislation do not persuade American courts to
extend the FARR Act to include intra-state transfers of expatriate American
citizens, these courts are nonetheless required to apply the FARR Act in
that manner so as to avoid conflict with international law.
"Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as
not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of
the United States."18 4 In this case, interpreting the FARR Act to allow for the
transfer of American citizens into the hands of authorities that would likely
torture them is against customary international law and therefore contrary
to international law. International custom, which forms a primary source of
international law,185 is derived from general practices among nations.186
Among the many practices to have attained the level of an enforceable law
is the prohibition on torture. 187 The plethora of international agreements is,
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 114 (1987). Murray v. The
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[Aln act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. . .").
185. Bodies such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as well as esteemed jurists
worldwide, recognize the important primary function of customary international law. The ICJ
identifies customary international law as a source of law only second to international treaties
and conventions. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-
14 (7th ed., 2008). But see ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 4 (1971) ("The questions of how custom comes into being and how it can be changed or
modified are wrapped in mystery and illogic."); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of
International Law, 47 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1977) (""[llnternational lawyers ... invoke rules of
customary international law every day, but they have great difficulty in agreeing on a
definition. . ."); Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: A Response to
Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143, 178 (2001) ("[miost commentators
acknowledge that opinio juris is a concept for which it is difficult to account with any
consistency, even though most acknowledge the need for some concept that will distinguish
behaviors that have legal consequences from those that do not."); Phillip R. Trimble, A
Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 709 (1986) (" [T]here are
basic theoretical problems inherent in the idea of customary international law.
186. BROWNLIE, supra note 185, at 6
187. GAIL H. MILLER, DEFINING TORTURE 3 (2008), available at
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/cms/uploadedFiles/FLOERSHEIMER/Defining%20Torture.pd
f ("Under customary international law, the prohibition of torture is jus cogens-a peremptory
norm that is non-derogable under any circumstances. It is binding on all nations. This elevated
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by itself, evidence of this. Essentially every international or regional
governmental organization has taken a staunch stance against the use of
torture.188 From the loosely confederated cultural organizations1 89 to
closely-knit economic and political unions,190 not a single organization
condones its use. In addition, the status of international customary law has
also been extended to the principle that a State may not send individuals
within its custody to a State that practices torture.191
Therefore, any interpretation of the FARR Act which would allow the
United States to transfer individuals to another State, where it is more likely
than not that they will be tortured, would be contrary to customary
international law. Consequently, courts must prohibit such transfers to
avoid incongruities with international law -whether those transfers occur
within the State receiving the individual in custody, or whether the
individual must cross borders.
III.PROSECUTING THE CRIME: OBTAINING AND EXERCISING JURISDICTION
188. See, e.g., Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 8, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 Int'l Hum.
Rts. Rep. 893 (2005); Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985,
Preamble, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 519 (1986) (reaffirming the determination that "cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment constitute[s] an offense against human
dignity."); African (BANJUL) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 5., 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982); American Convention on Human Rights art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (stating that no person "shall be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment or treatment"); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1, at 17. Also note, of the
192 States belonging to the United Nations, there are currently 156 members of the Convention
Against Torture, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en.
189. See, e.g., la Francophonie, D&claration de Bamako 4.D. (Nov. 3, 2000) available at
http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/DeclarationBamako.pdf (declaring that members
of la Francophonie commit to ratify and strictly enforce all documents protecting human
rights).
190. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
191. In much of international law, this principle is called non-refoulement and refers to the
transfer of refugees and immigrants to States where there is a likelihood of torture. See
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, and the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. However,
customary international law has expanded this definition to include the transfer of any
individual, whether he or she is an immigrant, refugee, or citizen of the transferring country,
when there is a substantial risk of torture. Convention Against Torture, supra note 20, at art. 3
("No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State . .")
(emphasis added). The Courts of England and Wales have already encountered this issue in
the cases of B & Others v. Secretary of State for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 12004] EWCA
Civ 1344 and R (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi) v. Secretary of State for Defence, 120081 EWHC 3098
(Divisional Court). In Al-Saadoon, specifically, the petitioners were Iraqi citizens, detained in
Iraq by British forces, for crimes they had committed in Iraq. There, the court reasoned that if
the treatment to which the petitioners would be exposed in Iraq "was so harsh as to constitute
a crime against humanity or . .. there is an immediate likelihood of their experiencing serious
injury," then any duty that the United Kingdom had to transfer the petitioners to Iraqi custody
would "fall away" as a result of its international obligations. Id. at § 94.
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Lastly, critics may point to one more important obstacle to this Article's
theory-if a foreign government, which is often guilty of torturing
prisoners in its charge, seeks the transfer or extradition of an American in
U.S. custody in order to prosecute or punish him for a crime that he
allegedly committed on its territory, 192 and the United States denies that
request, does that mean that the alleged criminal may escape prosecution
for the crimes that he committed while abroad?193 Saving a criminal from
torture only to let him go unpunished for any acts that he committed is
contrary to justice and could generate additional opposition to a custodial
State's refusal to make an intra-territorial transfer of custody.194
Fortunately, American and international law have already anticipated these
circumstances. The following section explains how this works by first
showing that States that engage in torture surrender their jurisdiction to
prosecute an alleged criminal. Second, this section explains how
international law allows the United States to step in and fill the
prosecutorial void left by the abusive State. The combined result is that
Americans who commit crimes overseas can be brought to justice-even
when no State maintains an unquestioned authority to prosecute because
the State that normally would have jurisdiction over their crimes has failed
to respect international Due Process norms.
A. Implied Consent to Surrender Jurisdiction
Under normal circumstances, American common law prohibits the U.S.
government from interfering in the penal processes of foreign governments.
192. This was actually the case of Mr. Mohammad Munaf. While in Iraq, Munaf was
allegedly involved in facilitating the kidnapping of a group of Romanian journalists and had
even been convicted by Iraqi authorities at the time that his habeas petition reached the
Supreme Court. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
193. Id. at 697 (stating that "habeas is not a means of compelling the United States to
harbor fugitives from the criminal justice system of a sovereign with undoubted authority to
prosecute them").
194. It appears that every time an alleged criminal is permitted to escape prosecution
because of his foreign citizenship under the doctrine of diplomatic immunity, this creates
tension and opposition between the two implicated States and puts a strain on the use of the
doctrine. See US embassy cables: US-Romania Relations Threatened by Musician's Death,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/130447 (stating that the
vehicular homicide of Romanian rock star Teo Peter caused by Staff Sergeant Christopher Van
Geothem, the Staff Sergeant's use of diplomatic immunity, and his immediate flight from
Romania were viewed by Romanians "as a slap in the face and an effort to shield the marine
from justice," each putting a significant strain on U.S.-Romanian relations); Rosalyn Higgins,
The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Recent United Kingdom Experience, 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 641, 643-45 (1985) (recounting the story of a woman constable who was shot by a gun
fired from the Libyan Embassy and all of the ensuing problems); Tara Young, Diplomat Flees
US. to Avoid Sex Charges, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2005, at B03 (reporting about an Emirati
diplomat who was arrested during a sting operation to discover sexual predators). These
problems are present even when each State has additional quid pro quo incentives to maintain
the status quo for diplomatic immunity. See generally YITIHA SIMBEYE, IMMUNITY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004). However, while refusing the intra-territorial transfer of an alleged
criminal may generate that same kind of conflict, it lacks the reciprocal incentives that preserve
the practice of diplomatic immunity.
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The Supreme Court's Neely v. Henkel decision 95 provides a clear example.
In that case, Mr. Charles Neely petitioned the Supreme Court, through a
writ of habeas corpus, to deny his extradition to Cuba where he was
wanted on embezzlement charges.196 Neely felt that he deserved relief
because the prosecution in Cuba would not preserve the rights guaranteed
to him by the U.S. Constitution.197 Of course, the Court found that
constitutional "provisions have no relation to crimes committed without
the jurisdiction of the United States against the law of a foreign country."198
More importantly, the Court found that "[w~hen an American citizen
commits a crime in a foreign country, he cannot complain if required to
submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that
country may prescribe for its own people."199 Essentially, when Americans
commit crimes overseas, the foreign authority has exclusive jurisdiction to
try them and they must submit to the punishment prescribed by that
authority's laws. 200
However, while foreign authorities have exclusive jurisdiction over
individuals who commit crimes within their territory, that jurisdiction is
not necessarily absolute. According to the Supreme Court, "[a] sovereign
nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws
committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to
surrender its jurisdiction." 201 Generally, States expressly consent to
surrender their jurisdiction through bilateral agreements -such as a
common Status of Forces Agreement. 202 Unfortunately, courts are silent as
to what exactly would be an implied surrender of jurisdiction.20s
Nevertheless, this Article's torture-threatened, expatriate American
detainee provides a perfect example of when consent to surrender
195. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
196. Id. at 114-15.
197. Id. at 114. Part of Neely's reasoning was based on the fact that, during the time of the
alleged embezzlement and extradition order, Cuba was still under the occupation and control
of the United States, much like Iraq during the Munaf case. Id. at 115.
198. Id. at 122.
199. Id. at 123.
200. Id.
201. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957) (emphasis added). See also Kinsella v.
Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 479 (1956) (holding that nations have a "sovereign right to try and
punish [American citizens] for offenses committed within their borders," unless they "have
relinquished [their] jurisdiction" to do so).
202. See, e.g., Agreement on the withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the
organization of their activities during their temporary presence in Iraq art. 12(3), U.S.-Iraq,
Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/
20081119 SOFAFINALAGREED.TEXT.pdf ("The United States shall have the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the United States Forces and of the civilian
component for matters arising inside agreed facilities and areas; during duty status outside
agreed facilities and areas; and in circumstances not covered by [a previous paragraph].").
Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97, 100 (D.D.C. 1968) (referring to a Status of Forces
Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea as having granted a limited
waiver of prosecutorial jurisdiction to the United States).
203. Numerous cases cite Wilson's language regarding the surrender of jurisdiction by a
State, but none of them ever goes on to explain its dictum and what an implied surrender of
jurisdiction may entail. See, e.g., U.S. v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 405 (5th Cir. 2008).
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jurisdiction should be implied. As has been demonstrated above, U.S.
constitutional and federal law, as well as customary international law and
international treaties, specifically bar the United States from transferring
any detainee into the custody of a State that would likely torture him.204
These laws have put foreign states on notice of the U.S.'s legal obligations
to both its citizens and the world community with respect to individuals in
its custody. In addition, the prohibition on torture has reached the status of
customary international law, and is binding on all States.205
As a result, any State that allows torture to persist within its system,
and yet demands the return of a criminal in American custody, has both
violated international law and (at least) negligently put the U.S. at odds
with its own obligations. Complying with such a request would not only
require the U.S. to contravene its own laws, but it would also make it an
accomplice to the offending State's own criminal activity. Consequently,
States that allow the menace of torture to persist within their borders
should be considered to have impliedly consented to surrender their
jurisdiction to prosecute individuals in the custody of another State.
B. Exercising Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Furthermore, the fact that a detainee committed a crime while overseas
does not necessarily restrict American authorities from prosecuting that
crime in the United States. A State may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction
over the actions of its nationals, even when those nationals are beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of that State.206
The Swedish case of Public Prosecutor v. Antoni207 illustrates the
international acceptance of this principle. In Antoni, the defendant, a
Swedish citizen, fell asleep at the wheel while driving in Germany. 208 His
negligence caused an accident that seriously injured three people, and the
Swedish government decided to prosecute.209 The defendant argued that
the Swedish Traffic Penal Code could not be applied "to an act committed
204. See supra Parts I & II. This "more likely than not" standard is essentially a
preponderance of evidence standard. This standard would apply to the threatened individual,
although the endemic use of torture within a territory could contribute to the increased
likelihood of an individual's imminent torture. Detractors may fear the politicization of such a
standard. These fears, however, may be misplaced. Generally, if the Executive makes a
determination to refuse an intra-State transfer, such a decision would be the Executive's
prerogative and any second-guessing by the Judiciary would be overstepping its constitutional
limitations. Nevertheless, as with any foreign policy decision, the broad consequences that
such a refusal may have on foreign relations can temper the effect of politics. If, however, the
Executive were to decide to proceed with a transfer (even for reasons of political expediency),
the detainee would still have the right to challenge that transfer.
205. See supra Part II.B. But see discussion supra note 185.
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987)
("[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ... the activities, interests, status, or
relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory.").
207. Public Prosecutor v. Antoni, 32 I.L.R. 140 (Sup. Ct. Swed. 1960).
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outside of Sweden,"210 but the Swedish Supreme Court disagreed, finding
that "in principle every crime committed by a Swedish citizen may be
punished, even if committed abroad." 211
American courts have also affirmed the application of this principle.
One recent example is the conviction of Chucky Taylor, an American citizen
and the son of former Liberian President Charles Taylor, for torture,
conspiracy to torture, and the use or possession of a firearm in connection
with a crime of violence. 212 Among other defenses, Mr. Taylor claimed that
the United States could not prosecute him for crimes of torture committed
outside of the United States, 213 nor could he be prosecuted for the ancillary
crime of using a firearm in connection with a violent crime for the same
reason.214 The Eleventh Circuit, however, disagreed. According to the court,
the United States has long maintained the power to exercise prescriptive
jurisdiction over acts committed abroad by its citizens or by foreigners who
enter within American territorial limits. 215 In addition, the Torture Act,
which aims to punish "whoever outside the United States commits . . .
torture,"216 clearly targets acts committed by individuals when they are
beyond American borders. Finally, because the only limitation that the
Eleventh Circuit could find to the ancillary offense of using a firearm in
connection with a violent crime, was that the crime must be one which can
"be prosecuted in the United States," 217 it too was applicable to extra-
territorial offenses.218
It is important to note, however, that the exercise of extraterritorial
prescriptive jurisdiction is not unrestricted. Prescriptive jurisdiction is
limited by the reasonableness of its application. 219 In the case of this
Article's hypothetical, the commission of a crime and the U.S.'s own legal
obligations, which may forbid it from delivering a suspect to a State that
would normally be responsible for prosecution, appears reasonable
enough.220 Nevertheless, other legitimate reasons for exercising prescriptive
210. Id. at 141.
211. Id. at 145. For another example of a foreign State exercising jurisdiction over the
crimes of its nationals committed while abroad, see Re Guitierrez, 24 I.L.R. 265 (Sup. Ct. Mex.
1957), where the Mexican government prosecuted one of its citizens for having stolen an
automobile while in the United States.
212. See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1511
(2011).
213. See id. at 810.
214. See id. at 793.
215. See id. at 810 (citing United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 136, 136 (5th Cir. 1980) (observing
that "[s]ince an early date, it has been recognized that Congress may attach extraterritorial
effect to its penal enactments," and that "a nation's 'power to secure itself from injury may
certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory.'" (quoting Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 187, 234 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.))).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
217. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 800 (citing 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)).
218. Id.
219. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987).
220. Id. cmt. b. ("The list of considerations in [section 403(2)] is not exhaustive. No priority
or other significance is implied in the order in which the factors are listed. Not all
considerations have the same importance in all situations; the weight to be given to any
[Vol. 1552
34
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol15/iss1/2
Tying OffAll Loose Ends
jurisdiction under these circumstances include: the nationality of the
alleged criminal,221 and the importance of the regulation to the international
political and legal systems.222
Even though constitutional and federal law prohibit the U.S.
government from transferring expatriate American detainees to States
where they will more likely than not face torture, "[t]he United States [can]
not be in the business of 'harbor[ing] fugitives."' 223 Fortunately, U.S. and
international law have provided a means to prosecute American criminals,
no matter where their crimes are committed. As a result, the United States
can come away from this Article's hypothetical situation with a clear
conscience in both senses-at ease knowing that it did not send an
individual to face torture, and yet also ensuring that justice is served for
any crimes that may have been committed.
CONCLUSION
"Freedom from torture is an inalienable human right." 224 Indeed, no
human being should ever have to suffer from its indignity. It is therefore
almost unimaginable to think that in the United States, the issue of whether
the government could permissibly surrender one of its expatriate citizens to
a State where torture is more likely than not to occur, if that citizen is
already located within that State, is unsettled. Yet, that is the opinion of
America's Highest Court.225
Nevertheless, this should be a non-issue, as U.S. federal and
constitutional law are quite clear: the United States may never be
responsible for the torture of American citizens in its custody, either
actively through its own dealings, or passively by transferring that citizen
into the custody of a foreign government - even in circumstances where the
expatriate citizen is already located within the territory of the torturing
sovereign. "Torture is wrong, no matter where it occurs, and the United
States [should] continue to lead the fight to eliminate it everywhere." 226 Let
us all hope that the Judiciary finds that everywhere also applies to
Americans while abroad.
particular factor or group of factors depends on the circumstances.")
221. Id. § 403 (2)(b).
222. Id. § 403 (2)(e).
223. Leading Cases, Jurisdiction Over Americans Held Overseas, 122 HARV. L. REV. 415, 422
(2008) (referring to Munafv. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008)).
224. President Bush's Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of
Victims of Torture, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1167-68 (June 26, 2004), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2004_presidential
documents&docid=pd05jy04_txt-5.pdf.
225. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 703, n.6 ("It is not settled that the [FARR Act forbidding the
transfer of individuals to likely torturers] addresses the transfer of an individual located in
Iraq to the Government of Iraq.").
226. President Bush's Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of
Victims of Torture, supra note 224.
532012]
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